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ABSTRACT While benchmarks are important tools for portfolio managers and investors
alike, we challenge the conventional wisdom that they are paradigms of investing excellence.
Despite the effective marketing campaigns that have brought benchmarks into the public
consciousness and attracted signiﬁcant capital to passive investment strategies, few
investors fully understand how these benchmarks are calculated or what they represent.
We dissect the benchmark construction process and reveal how decisions made by index
providers can lead to unintended factor exposures in various benchmarks. Using the Russell
Midcap® Value Index as our primary example, we ﬁnd evidence of size, momentum and
sector tilts, as well as outsized exposure to interest rates, clientele effects and low-quality
businesses. We demonstrate that without full understanding of benchmark construction,
evaluations of active-manager performance are unreliable. Moreover, factors that have led to
outperformance by index funds in recent years could easily reverse.
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INTRODUCTION
‘This is the darkest of days’, Morningstar’s
Vice President of research, John
Rekenthaler, recently warned The Wall Street
Journal. ‘Active management has never been
in worse repute’. According to
Rekenthaler’s ﬁrm, 78 per cent of active
domestic equity managers trailed their
relevant benchmarks in 2014.1 Despite
strong relative returns from active strategies
in 2013, critics cite the 2014 data as evidence
that active managers lack sufﬁcient
investment skill to justify their fees.2 Fund
investors appear to agree. In 2014, actively
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managed domestic equity funds saw US$13
billion in net withdrawals, while their
passively managed counterparts received
$244 billion in net subscriptions.3
The superiority of passive investing
seems to have become conventional
wisdom, but we challenge the view that the
benchmark is the archetype of investing
excellence. Despite the effective marketing
campaigns that have brought benchmarks
into the public consciousness, few
investors fully understand how these
benchmarks are calculated or what they
represent. Even some of the oldest market
benchmarks are poorly understood. Take
the iconic Dow Jones Industrial Average®
(DJIA). Journalists and politicians
frequently refer to the DJIA as a gauge of the
overall US stock market and economy, even
though it is a price-weighted index.4
The change in the DJIA from one period to
the next only provides an estimate of the US
stock market return if each of its constituent
companies has an equal number of shares
outstanding, which is obviously not the
case.5 Clearly, failure to understand how a
benchmark is constructed can lead to
improper inferences about its meaning, and
the DJIA is but one example. With the
plethora of indexes available in the
marketplace, and the proliferation of funds
that mimic them, the potential for
misunderstanding is signiﬁcant.
In this article, we examine the purpose of
benchmarks, discuss how benchmarks are
selected in practice, and demonstrate why
benchmark construction matters to both
active and passive investors. We show how
to identify tilts in benchmarks and explain
why no benchmark is inherently good
(or bad). Using the case of a mid-cap value
manager, we highlight some shortcomings
of blindly relying on the natural choice of a
value benchmark. We conclude that
benchmarks can be useful tools for
estimating opportunity cost and evaluating
manager skill, but they are only beneﬁcial if
they are well-understood.
PURPOSE OF BENCHMARKS
A well-designed benchmark provides
information that is useful to investors and
fund managers. Generally speaking, a
benchmark allows for the calculation of an
average return on a basket of assets. For
example, the S&P 500® Index measures the
average return on roughly 500 of the largest
public companies in the United States,
weighted by market capitalization. The return
on a benchmark provides the basis for
measuring opportunity cost – the return one
would have earned had he invested in that
pool of assets at their benchmark weights –
which is helpful for evaluating asset allocation
decisions. Moreover, the benchmark provides
the basis for evaluating the performance of an
active manager. The relative risk-adjusted
return, or alpha, of a portfolio versus an
appropriate benchmark is a helpful
quantitative measure of its manager’s skill.
Outside of the special case of the ‘market
portfolio’ of the capital asset pricing model
introduced by Sharpe (1964), a benchmark does
not necessarily represent the optimal portfolio
of assets within a given opportunity set.
Stambaugh (1982), Fama and French (1998)
and others show that even broad market
indexes fail to exhibit mean-variance efﬁciency.
Narrowly deﬁned benchmarks, such as sector-
and size-constrained indexes, are even less likely
to be optimal in the mean-variance sense.
BENCHMARK SELECTION
A manager selects a benchmark based on his
investment strategy and opportunity set. For
example, a US equity fund manager might
select a benchmark based on the strategy’s:
(1) objective (for example, income versus
capital appreciation),
(2) target size (for example, large-cap versus
small-cap),
(3) style (for example, growth versus value)
and
(4) breadth (for example, diversiﬁed versus
sector-focused).
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There are myriad benchmarks from which
to choose, although a handful of index
providers, such as S&P Dow Jones, Russell
Investments and MSCI, produce the most
widely referenced benchmarks for US equity
funds. Selecting a lesser-known benchmark
can affect the marketability of a fund, so most
managers opt for a brand name, as shown in
Table 1.
Benchmark selection is a serious matter.
Once a fund selects a benchmark, it is difﬁcult
to switch. A domestic mutual fund must
obtain board approval and ﬁle with the SEC
to change its benchmark. Plus, the fund must
report its performance versus both its new and
former benchmarks for a period of time. Even
if a manager takes the appropriate legal steps
to effectuate a benchmark change, many
investors will look askance at a benchmark
change and assume that it is simply a cosmetic
treatment for poor performance.
An investor typically establishes his
investment objectives and selects a manager
accordingly. For example, a pension manager
might allocate a portion of his assets to a
speciﬁc class, such as mid-cap domestic
equities. If he intends to measure his
performance against the Russell Midcap®
Index, he would ideally select a fund that uses
the same benchmark.
As performance relative to the benchmark
is viewed as one of the primary barometers of
manager skill, selecting an appropriate
benchmark is critical for both the manager
and investor. In selecting a benchmark, a
manager balances the need for accuracy of
measurement with a desire to outperform.
Choosing a benchmark that closely matches
his strategy and opportunity set helps him
avoid exposure to unwanted risk factors that
might lead to underperformance. However,
Kroah (2011) suggests that many managers
draw signiﬁcantly from securities outside of
their chosen benchmarks. The implication is
that these managers deliberately select
misaligned benchmarks with the goal of
generating outperformance that is unrelated
to their skill. A common example of this is a
manager who uses a large capitalization
benchmark while investing heavily in small
capitalization stocks, seeking to take
advantage of the small-stock effect
documented by Fama and French (1993).
A more extreme example is a manager who
knowingly selects an inappropriate
benchmark to increase the chances of
differentiating his performance with outlier
returns. This manager hopes that investors
will mistake such outperformance for skill.
Recognizing the competing interests of
managers, prudent investors take several steps
to conﬁrm that benchmark choices are
appropriate. First, they evaluate how a
benchmark aligns with a fund’s stated
investment objectives. For instance, a fund
designed to invest in high-yield corporate
bonds that uses a government bond index
rightly arouses suspicion. Second, investors
compare the fund’s holdings with its
benchmark constituents to determine if the
manager’s security selections are drawn from
his intended universe. Holdings of foreign
companies by a domestic equity manager, for
example, could be an indication of style drift
that warrants further examination. Third,
shrewd investors devote time to
understanding how a manager’s process and
philosophy might produce returns that
deviate from a given benchmark. Consider
the manager who states, ex ante, that he
intends to avoid investments in highly
regulated businesses, such as banks and
utilities, because of his belief that such
businesses produce inferior risk-adjusted
returns through the full economic cycle.
This manager could expect his performance












Source: Morningstar, as of 31 December 2014.
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to differ signiﬁcantly from a benchmark that
contains large weightings in these businesses.
Such deviations would reﬂect the manager’s
self-imposed constraints but not his skill.
In the absence of a more appropriate
benchmark, both parties would need to
understand the benchmark’s construction to
properly evaluate the manager’s performance.
BENCHMARK CONSTRUCTION
In order to properly use a benchmark, one
must understand how it is constructed.6 For
example, consider the Russell US Equity
Indexes, a family of market cap-weighted
indexes widely used by managers. Each June,
Russell ranks, in descending order of market
capitalization, all of the common stocks of
US companies. The top 3000 stocks in this
list become the constituents of the Russell
3000® Index. The largest 1000 stocks
become the Russell 1000® Index
(a prominent benchmark for large-cap equity
funds), and the next 2000 stocks in this list
become the constituents of the Russell
2000® Index (a popular small-cap
benchmark). Companies that rank 201st–
1000th in size, which are a subset of the
Russell 1000, become the Russell Midcap
Index. These are examples of primary
indexes.
Russell further reﬁnes its primary indexes
by style. One such style distinction is growth
versus value. This is where the construction
methodology gets highly technical. Russell
takes all of the constituents of a primary
index, such as the Russell Midcap Index, and
sorts them based on two fundamental
attributes, historical sales growth and
forecasted EPS growth, and one valuation
attribute, the book-to-price (B/P) ratio.
Russell uses the fundamental attributes to
determine whether a company possesses
growth characteristics, and it uses the B/P
ratio to assess value.7 It then applies a ‘non-
linear probability method’ to assign
companies to the growth and value
benchmarks (Russell Investments, 2014).8
Russell’s process has some important
nuances. For one, a company can be
represented in both the Russell Midcap®
Growth Index and the Russell Midcap Value
Index.9 In fact, the average of the company’s
weights in the value and growth indexes is its
weight in the primary index. As all companies
are fully represented by the combination of
their growth and value weights, if a company
has 80 per cent of its weight in the value index,
it has 20 per cent of its weight in the growth
index. This concept is illustrated in Table 2.
Likewise, a company with equal growth and
value prospects has the same weight in each of
the stylized indexes as in the primary index.
Those companies with strong (weak)
growth attributes and weak (strong) value
attributes are entirely assigned to the growth
(value) index. A company appearing in only
one style index has twice the weight in that
index as compared with its weight in the
primary index. Companies with strong
growth and strong value attributes are assigned
to both indexes. Interestingly, companies with
neither strong growth nor strong value
attributes are also assigned to both indexes. A
company that is assigned to both styles has less
weight in each stylized index relative to its
weight in the primary index as compared with
a similar company assigned to only one index.
Russell’s treatment over overlapping
companies is common among providers of
stylized indexes. However, in an effort to
create factor portfolios that are not diluted by
overlapping stocks, S&P Dow Jones launched
a Pure Style Index Series that contains only
companies that possess strong tendencies
toward growth or value.
BENCHMARK DESIGN
IMPLICATIONS
The case of the Russell Midcap
Value Index
After gaining familiarity with the construction
process, one can begin to consider its
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implications for the benchmark. The Russell
Midcap Value Index proved to be a
challenging benchmark to beat in 2014,10 so
it provides an interesting case study. To
analyze the Russell Midcap Value Index, we
start with the benchmark from which
it is derived, the Russell Midcap Index.
The simplest observation about the Russell
Midcap Index is that a large portion of the
benchmark is concentrated in a small number
of companies. Roughly half of the index
weight consists of about a quarter of the
constituents. This is a common feature of
market cap-weighted indexes.11 Moreover,
because of its deﬁnition as the smallest 800
names in the Russell 1000 Index, the Russell
Midcap Index includes many companies that
would traditionally be considered large-cap.
At the end of 2014, about one sixth of the
constituents of the Russell Midcap Index had
market capitalizations greater than $15 billion,
and approximately a third of the weight in the
benchmark was assigned to these companies.
So, the investor who deliberately constrains
his opportunity set to include mid-cap
equities should be aware that the Russell
Midcap Index has a size tilt relative to an
equal-weight portfolio.12 As a result, the
performance of large-cap companies has a
pronounced impact on the returns of this
index.
Like all other market cap-weighted
benchmarks, the Russell Midcap Index
overweights high-momentum securities.
Because the weight of an individual company
depends on its market capitalization, those
stocks with recent outperformance have
grown in weight relative to recent
underperformers. Moreover, Hsu (2006) and
Treynor (2005) show that overvalued stocks
have higher weights in a cap-weighted index
than would be warranted by their
(unobservable) fair values. Arnott et al (2005)
also notes that, relative to a portfolio of
companies weighted by fundamental
measures, such as sales, book value or cash
ﬂow, cap-weighted indexes have a tilt toward
high-multiple stocks with strong perceived
growth opportunities. These characteristics
coerce cap-weighted indexes into assuming
growth and momentum characteristics, which
can lead to underperformance of contrarian or
value-based strategies in certain market
environments.
Russell’s deﬁnitions of growth and value
have implications for portfolio management.
Table 2: Benchmark weightings for retail equity REITs in the Russell Midcap Index
Index weighting
Company name Ticker Primary Value Growth V+G
Brixmor Property Group, Inc BRX 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04
CBL & Associates Properties, Inc CBL 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.10
DDR Corp. DDR 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.18
Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.27
General Growth Properties, Inc GGP 0.25 0.51 0.00 0.51
Kimco Realty Corporation KIM 0.16 0.33 0.00 0.33
Macerich Company MAC 0.20 0.42 0.00 0.42
National Retail Properties, Inc NNN 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.17
Realty Income Corporation O 0.16 0.34 0.00 0.34
Regency Centers Corporation REG 0.09 0.19 0.00 0.19
Retail Properties of America, Inc Class A RPAI 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.13
Spirit Realty Capital, Inc SRC 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.15
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc SKT 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.10
Taubman Centers, Inc TCO 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.14
Weingarten Realty Investors WRI 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.14
WP Glimcher, Inc WPG 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.09
Total 1.60 2.91 0.37 3.29
Source: Russell Investments, as of 31 December 2014.
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Companies with relatively strong historical
sales growth and strong projected earnings
growth are probably fairly characterized as
‘growth’ businesses. After all, they have been
growing and are expected to grow in the
future. However, the deﬁnition of value is less
straightforward. Managers who employ
quantitative screens typically use
combinations of forward and trailing earnings
to price and even cash ﬂow from operations
to enterprise value (see Rao et al, 2015, for a
compact discussion of the theory and
implementation of value factor investing by
active managers). Others deﬁne value as a
reasonable price in relation to business quality,
stability, or growth prospects. Russell deﬁnes
value solely by the B/P ratio.13 This has
important implications.
[W]e ... estimate an earnings range for ﬁve
years out…we… buy the stock… if it sells
at a reasonable price in relation to the
bottom boundary of our estimate.– (Warren
Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Corporation
2013 Shareholder Letter)
Finance theory suggests that there is a
reason why one company has a higher-B/P
ratio than another, and it relates to the relative
return on equity (ROE) of each company.
Ranking companies based on B/P alone tends
to favor businesses with low ROEs. This is
because the B/P metric is inversely related to
ROE, as shown in the following derivation
(Stowe et al, 2002).
Assume a stock is fairly valued by the
single-stage Gordon Growth Model,14
written in terms of next year’s earnings:

















P0 Current value of equity
D1 Dividend at t= 1
E1 Earnings at t= 1
PR Dividend payout ratio
B0 Book value of equity at t= 0
ROE Return on equity at t= 1, or
E1/B0
re Cost of equity
g Organic growth rate in earnings
and dividends.
Since B/P and ROE are inversely related,
high B/P companies tend to be low-ROE
businesses.15 Some of these businesses have
ROEs that are depressed because of historical
acquisitions or cyclical factors, but many are
structurally constrained because of high
capital intensity (for example, banks and
REITs) or regulation (for example, utilities).
Hence, value as deﬁned by Russell may
not reﬂect cheapness. It may be a function of
high capital intensity, regulation and/or ﬁerce
competition, which are often indications of
low business quality. Perhaps some value-
oriented managers speciﬁcally seek out these
low-return businesses. If so, the Russell value
benchmarks are appropriate for them.
However, the value investing narrative that
we hear more frequently involves (i)
identifying quality businesses with high
returns on capital and (ii) paying a reasonable
price relative to the expected earnings or cash
ﬂows such businesses will produce over time.
The number one idea is to view a stock as an
ownership of the business and to judge the
staying quality of the business in terms of its
competitive advantage. Look for more value
in terms of discounted future cash- ﬂow
than you are paying for.– (Charlie Munger,
iconic value investor and vice-chairman of
Berkshire Hathaway Corporation)
The Russell determination of value does
not directly consider price relative to cash
ﬂow or earnings. While earnings are an input
into the calculation (see equation above),
consider the case of a capital-light business
that produces a 40 per cent ROE and trades in
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the market for 10 times earnings. Is this not a
value? According to Russell’s distinction
between value and growth, it likely is not.16
Clearly, the manager that subscribes to the
Buffett–Munger deﬁnition of value could
have a vastly different portfolio construction
than what is captured in the benchmark.
If one were to take a cross-section of
companies in the same industry, such as
commercial banking, and compare them on
their B/P ratios, one might reasonably draw a
conclusion about their relative values. After all,
they face the same regulations and have similar
capital structures. So, ranking companies based
on B/P ratios might be fair for companies
within an industry, but the Russell
methodology ranks companies across
industries.17 As a result, all companies with
high B/P ratios, regardless of industry, rank
highly on Russell’s value scale. This approach
tends to apply the value tag to entire industries
with high B/P ratios, such as REITs, utilities
and banks. An emphasis on these speciﬁc
industries is indeed evident in the Russell value
indexes, as shown in Figure 1.
This phenomenon is persistent over time,
as well. For instance, the Russell Midcap
Value Index consistently contains a large
weighting in REITs, utilities and banks, as
shown in Figure 2.
Industry concentrations can make a
benchmark vulnerable to macroeconomic
factors and clientele effects.18 The large
weightings of REITs and utilities in the
Russell Midcap Value Index provide a
pertinent example. The above-average
dividend yields of REITs and utilities have
historically made them desirable investment
vehicles for yield-oriented investors.
As shown in Figure 3, this clientele effect
Russell Mid Cap Value Russell Mid Cap Russell Mid Cap Growth
Russell 1000 Value Russell 1000 Russell 1000 Growth












































Figure 1: Industry weightings in major US equity benchmarks.
Source: Russell Investments, as of 31 December 2014.
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has recently intensiﬁed. With interest rates
hovering near all-time lows, the correlations
of REIT and utility stock returns with those
of US Treasury bonds have increased to
extreme levels. Hence, it comes as no surprise
that, against a backdrop of quantitative easing
and generally low-interest rates, REITs and
utilities have performed well. This has
boosted the Russell Midcap Value Index
materially and led to signiﬁcant
underperformance among mid-cap value
managers. According to DeSanctis and Wang
(2015), mid-cap value managers were 840
basis points underweight REITs and 580 basis
points underweight utilities in 2014.
The strong performance of these two sectors
in 2014 caused the returns of actively
managed funds to trail their benchmarks by a
wide margin. However, it is possible to
imagine an environment in which the
attributes of REITs and utilities are less
desirable. With more than a quarter of the
Russell Midcap Value Index exposed to these
two areas, any increase in interest rates or
disassembly of the yield-hungry investor
clientele could have a meaningful, negative
impact on its performance.
A further implication of the Russell
approach to constructing its stylized
benchmarks is that, ceteris paribus, the growth
indexes overweight expensive stocks, and the
value indexes overweight low-growth
businesses. This is best illustrated with an
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Figure 3: Correlation of relative returns with bond returns.
Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research, Ibbotson Associates, Bloomberg LP and Empirical Research






















Figure 2: Time series of sector weightings in the Russell Midcap Value Index.
Source: Russell Investments, as of 31 December 2014.
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Both have weightings of 1 per cent in the
primary index, and both rank highly on the
growth scale. Company B ranks highly on the
value scale, while A ranks near the bottom. As
shown in Figure 4, despite having similar
growth attributes, B receives a lower weighting
in the growth index than A. This feature of the
Russell methodology serves to amplify the
signal associated with each stylized benchmark.
However, it is in stark contrast to the likely
approach of many portfolio managers. While a
manager might prefer the less-expensive stocks
from among a collection of fast-growing
companies, the Russell growth methodology
exhibits a preference for the expensive
companies. By the same token, the manager
might prefer cheap stocks that also have
favorable growth prospects, but the Russell
value methodology favors those that lack
growth. Intuition suggests that, in the long run,
this manager could outperform his stylized
benchmark. However, in the short run, he
could suffer bouts of underperformance if the
most expensive growth companies or slowest
growing value companies produce superior
returns.
CONCLUSIONS
In the case of a mid-cap value manager who is
benchmarked against the Russell Midcap
Value Index, there are numerous construction
issues that a client needs to consider when
evaluating performance relative to the
benchmark. These include tilts in favor of
size, momentum, and low-ROE businesses,
vulnerability to industry concentration and
clientele effects, and a preference to avoid
growth, even when it is cheaply priced. Any
of these issues could account for deviations in
manager performance that are not reﬂective
of skill. Only a client who truly understands
these benchmark construction issues is able to
make a reasonable inference about that
manager’s performance over a given time
period.
Understanding benchmark construction
might be even more important for passive
investors. Again, consider the Russell
Midcap Value Index. According to
Morningstar, there is more than $40 billion
in client money invested in passive
investment vehicles (exchange-traded funds
or mutual funds) that are attempting to
replicate the performance of the Russell
Midcap Value Index. These investors have
fared remarkably well for the last 3 years,
outperforming more than 80 per cent of
actively managed funds in the mid-cap value
category, as shown in Figure 5. However, if
these investors have not studied their
benchmark carefully, they might be surprised
























SCALED SCORE STYLE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING
COMPANY GROWTH VALUE GROWTH VALUE PRIMARY GROWTH VALUE
A 1.0 0.0 100% 0% 1% 2% 0%
B 1.0 1.0 50% 50% 1% 1% 1%
COMPANY A COMPANY B
Figure 4: Process of assigning companies to stylized benchmarks.
Sources: Russell Investments and RS Investments.
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bond proxies,19 heavily skewed toward low-
ROE businesses and systematically
underweight in companies that show signs of
growth. A rational decision for these
investors might be to take proﬁts and select a
manager who deviates from the benchmark
(a.k.a., an active manager).
Benchmarks are pervasive in today’s
investing environment, but it is important to
remember that there is nothing inherently
bad or good about a benchmark. While
benchmarks can be helpful tools for
estimating opportunity cost and evaluating
manager skill, they are only beneﬁcial if they
are well-understood. Inappropriate
application of benchmarks can lead to
incorrect evaluations and improper capital
allocation decisions.
The Russell indexes are not ﬂawed just
because they exhibit the tilts mentioned in
this article. All benchmarks are predisposed to
certain factors. That means even passive
investment strategies involve active decisions.
Those decisions are simply made by
benchmark providers rather than by fund
managers. Whether investors choose active or
passive investment strategies, they must
recognize what tilts are present and account
for these when using the benchmark to
allocate capital or evaluate manager
performance.
Most active managers underperformed
their benchmarks in 2014. Judging whether
they performed poorly or not requires an
understanding of how a benchmark is
constructed and how its implicit exposures
relate to the managers’ opportunity sets and
constraints. In the case of active mid-cap
value managers, a small number of factors
had an outsized inﬂuence on the
benchmark’s performance. Should those
factors reverse in the future, actively
managed funds could outperform.
Benchmark returns have had a good run,
but fund investors would be wise to
remember that it is always darkest just
before the dawn.
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NOTES
1. Statistics such as this are not overly surprising, as Sharpe
(1991) demonstrates that active strategies, in aggregate,
must underperform the benchmark by their level of fees.
However, because summary statistics based on mutual
funds do not fully represent the performance of all active
strategies and are not dollar weighted, they are not








Figure 5: Per cent of active managers in the mid-cap value category who failed to beat the Russell Midcap Value
Index.
Sources: Zephyr StyleADVISOR and Morningstar, Inc. On the basis of 3-year rolling windows over the last 25
years.
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2. This debate has been ongoing for decades. Carhart
(1997) ﬁnds little evidence of manager skill and concludes
that most funds underperform by about the magnitude of
their expenses. However, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015)
show that, while most funds destroy value, active mutual
funds, in aggregate, do add value because of the fact that most
of the capital is controlled by skilled managers.
3. According to the Morningstar Direct database.
4. A price-weighted index weights the constituents based on
their share prices. At 31 December 2014, this meant that
Goldman Sachs, which was an $83 billion company with a
share price of $194, had a weighting nearly eight times as
large as General Electric, which had a share price of
$25 but a market value of $250 billion.
5. See Maginn et al (2007) for a complete discussion of issues
related to price-weighted indices.
6. This can require a meaningful investment of time, as
benchmark construction can be a complex, esoteric process.
7. Other index providers, such as S&P and MSCI, use multiple
factors in their determination of value.
8. The non-linear probability method applies a sigmoid
function to translate the raw growth and value rankings into
numbers between 0 and 1.
9. This is typically true for about 30 per cent of the companies
in the primary index.
10. Less than one in 10 mid-cap value managers outperformed
the Russell Midcap Value Index in 2014, and the average
fund trailed its benchmark by roughly 5 percentage points,
according to Morningstar research.
11. In an extreme example, 50 per cent of the weight of the
Russell 3000 Index was concentrated in its top 100
constituents as of 31 December 2014.
12. This is not a problem that is easily avoided. As discussed in
Arnott et al (2010), equal-weight portfolios have
implementation issues of their own, namely higher
transaction costs and lower capacity.
13. B/P is the inverse of the price-to-book (P/B) ratio, so a
higher-B/P ratio represents a lower valuation.
14. A model for determining the intrinsic value of a stock
based on a future series of dividends that grow at a
constant rate.
15. This assumes that actual stock prices resemble the intrinsic
values implied by the Gordon Growth Model.
16. Assume a book value of $10. An ROE of 40 per cent
implies earnings of $4. A valuation of 10 times earnings
would imply a $40 value. B/P would thus be 0.25x, which
is a relatively low B/P ratio.
17. Recall that Russell determines a company’s value score by
sorting all of the companies in the index by their B/P ratios.
18. Clientele effects are speciﬁc attributes of a security, often
related to taxation, corporate structure, or dividend policy,
that create demand from investors independent of business
fundamentals.
19. From an asset allocation perspective, this could create
unintended redundancy with an investor’s existing ﬁxed-
income allocation.
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